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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Race in the age of tribeless youth culture: Rick Famuyiwa’s Dope (2015) and
recent shifts in African-American pop culture
Jeeshan Gazi
Independent Researcher, London, UK
ABSTRACT
This article posits Rick Famuyiwa’s 2015 film Dope as a site of convergence for broader shifts
in recent African-American pop culture against the backdrop of post-racial ideology. Firstly,
the film demonstrates how, while youth culture is now largely “tribeless,” the sonic bound-
aries between subcultures having collapsed, the corresponding racial boundaries neverthe-
less persist. Having established this, it is then argued that the film’s social media infused
narrative, as well as its production and marketing, resonates with the broader new media
strategies taken by African-American artists to create a space of power within still white-
dominated media industries. Particular attention will be given to the way in which the artist-
owned streaming site Tidal has subverted the politics of neoliberal colorblindness through







This article posits Rick Famuyiwa’s 2015 film Dope as a
site of convergence for broader shifts in recent African-
American pop culture against the backdrop of post-
racial ideology. Dope centers on Malcolm Adekanbi
(Shameik Moore), a high school senior in an area of
Inglewood, California, locally referred to as “the
Bottoms.” Seeking to attend Harvard, Malcolm finds
the weeks in which his application is being finalized
disrupted by a rucksack of MDMA that is first foisted
upon him and which he is then expected to sell. A fish-
out-of-water scenario, this nerd turned drug dealer
extricates himself from this situation through a creative
use of new media and other web-based technologies. In
the first section of this essay, I explain how the char-
acters depicted in Dope exemplify what I refer to as
“tribeless” youth culture. As hip-hop fans who play
punk music, for instance, these characters trounce the
boundaries between what were once warring tribes of
youth culture, and thus reflect the reality of contempor-
ary pop culture, as evidenced by recording artists such
as N.E.R.D., the listening habits of millennials, and the
line-ups of music festivals. Given these various subcul-
tures once delineated strict racial divisions, the tribeless
aesthetic carries a post-racial connotation: the notion
that racial divisions among Americans no longer per-
sist, that the US is now “indeed a color-blind nation”
(Bonilla-Silva and Childers 2014, 24). Famuyiwa’s film
could thus be read as pandering to such post-racial
ideology, which denies institutional racism and has
been effective in using the language of equality to
implement racist policies that “re-center whiteness
through law” (Chin 2012, 370). However, in the second
section of this article, it is argued that Famuyiwa under-
cuts such post-racialism by presenting these characters’
status as “geeks,” and the narrative situation they are
placed within, as specifically informed by race. Having
established this, a point of convergence between Dope
and broader developments in recent African-American
culture is then examined in detail in the third part of the
article. Here I argue that the characters’ use of web-
based technologies to extricate themselves from their
problematic situation resonates with a broader adop-
tion of new media by African-American recording
artists in a manner that exploits the post-racial aesthetic
of tribeless youth culture in order to create a space of
economic power for minority artists.
Tribeless youth culture
A quick opening montage establishes Malcolm’s pas-
sions via shots of “Yo! MTV Raps” VHS tapes, a
cassette walkman, a Super Nintendo console, and
the posters of luminaries of the late 1980s and early
1990s rap scene that fill his bedroom. With its refer-
ence to Bitcoin, however, his first line of dialogue
establishes that this film is set in the contemporary
era. It is at this point that Forrest Whittaker’s anon-
ymous narrator announces: “Malcolm Adekanbi is a
geek.” His friends Cassandra “Diggy” Andrews
(Kiersey Clemons) and James “Jib” Caldones (Tony
Revolori) are also declared to be “geeks” upon their
first appearance. The trio play in a punk band called
Awreeoh and, within the milieu of the Bottoms, are
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said to be bullied because: “they’re into white shit,
like skateboards, comic books, and Donald Glover.
And for listening to white shit, like Trash Talk and
TV on the Radio. And for doing white shit, like
getting good grades and applying to college.”
Acknowledging that the “big lesson this movie is
going for is the idea that Black people can be complex
human beings,” critic Israel Daramola (2015) neverthe-
less argues that the film lacks nuance in its representa-
tion of “blackness.” Daramola reads the positioning of
the protagonists as geeks as establishing a division
within the black community such that “everyone
who’s meant to be positioned as ‘different’ in the film
is so because they’re ‘book smart’ and trying to get into a
college”—specified as “white shit” by the film’s narrator
—as against the other black kids who are deemed “part
of the problem” concerning African-American social
mobility. As such, he argues that Dope “is a high school
movie with high school-level thought processes on race
that it tries to pass off as enlightened and appeases the
sensibilities of existing white liberal ideas on the topic
without offering any sort of self-awareness.” However,
while being “book smart” is certainly, and unfortu-
nately, designated as “white shit” in the film, a closer
look at the list specified by the narrator demonstrates
how the division described by Daramola is more com-
plex than it first appears. After all, Donald Glover is a
black rapper who also starred in cult nerd-culture meta-
comedy TV show Community (2009–2015), the cited
indie band of TV on the Radio has mostly black mem-
bers, while half of hardcore punk band Trash Talk are
African-American, and the first American to have a full
manga series published in Japan is the black Felipe
Smith.1 These figures act as signifiers for the complexity
of racial representation within Dope.
What makes the characters “different” is less their
book smarts than what I refer to as their “tribeless”
aesthetic, an aesthetic (both in costume and charac-
terization) that finds the trio breaking with the repre-
sentation of young African-Americans, and African-
American culture, cinematically established by the
New Black Cinema—the period of independent, and
later studio-backed, African-American cinema that
roughly stretched from 1985 to 1995. This tribeless
aesthetic relates to the pluralist interests described by
Pharrell Williams, musician and executive producer
of the film:
I felt like there was a parallel between my story and
what Rick was communicating in the film. . . . We
weren’t the toughest guys in the world in high
school, but we also weren’t afraid. And we felt like
being intelligent was not necessarily a negative
thing. . . .We have a lot of gangsters, we have a lot
of drug dealers, we have rock stars, we have EDM
DJ's, we have all those things, but where is the guy
who has mixed interests, who considers himself a
pluralist, who’s good in academics but he’s also into
skateboarding? (Open Road Films 2015, 6)
It is this tribeless aesthetic that opens Dope to further
criticism, however, for by adopting this aesthetic,
Famuyiwa’s film can appear to reinforce the post-racial
ideology of “race-neutral universalism” (Cho 2008–
2009, 1062). This is despite its narrative content
emphasizing that race persists within the tribelessness
of contemporary youth culture, suggesting that the
film suffers the same flaw as the New Black Cinema,
which scholars such as Norman K. Denzin (2002, 115)
have argued had the positive effect of giving black
filmmakers a voice, yet inadvertently worked to rein-
force conservative, racist, sentiments.
The tribeless aesthetic presented in Dope has its
roots in the early 2000s with the emergence of
Pharrell Williams and Kanye West. Pharrell ran a
record company called “Star Trax” and, instead of a
gang sign, would throw up the Vulcan salute when
performing with his band N.E.R.D., while West was
the rap producer who had intended to create video
game soundtracks, a self-stated college drop out in an
era of hip-hop in which Mafioso pretensions still
lingered.2 While transcending any anchoring to the
contemporaneously emerging rap scene of “nerd-
core,” and now having mostly moved on from their
earlier geekiness, the impact of this nerd aesthetic has
only in recent years come to be fully stated, most
prominently in the form of rap collective Odd Future
Wolfgang Kill Them All.3 The group’s ostensible
figurehead of Tyler the Creator is an avid collector
of Pharrell’s Ice Cream clothing range and arguably
informs the visual aesthetic of Malcolm, who is pre-
sented as a fan of the group’s Casey Veggies. Further,
the music of the protagonists’ band is in fact written
by Pharrell and is very much in the mode of N.E.R.D.
However, while Malcolm and his friends are charac-
terized as geeks, Pharrell, N.E.R.D., old school Kanye,
and Odd Future, are considered cool.
Where once youth culture was split into a myriad
of subcultures—mods, rockers, punks, goths, emos,
etc.—the tribeless culture is one in which their iPods,
phones, laptops, or, yes, vinyl collections, are likely to
run the gamut from psychedelic folk rock to under-
ground hip-hop to the latest subgenre of electronic
music. Writing a comment piece for British paper
The Observer, Vanessa Thorpe (2011) argues that the
past decade has seen a tearing down of the walls that
separated popular genres. These were not always
walls between warring enemies, but the borders
separating different kinds of sound, whether reggae
from ska or rock from indie, have been the site of
skirmishes since the first track was laid down on
shellac, and probably before.
Thorpe suggests that this “wholesale cross-fertiliza-
tion of musical conventions owes a lot to new tech-
nology,” and the accessibility of MP3s and music
video files via streaming and social media sites,
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whether paid for or free, certainly attests to this, given
that music seekers can easily listen to sounds that,
20 years ago, they wouldn’t necessarily want to spend
money on trying out.4 Responding to Thorpe’s article
for Flavorwire, Tom Hawking (2011) suggests that
while “casual listeners might get exposed to a greater
diversity of genres than they used to,” the “fiercely
territorial tendencies of music nerds” remain.
However, a report from YPulse, a research agency
focused on charting the attitudes of millenials, sug-
gests otherwise:
Ypulse surveyed 1,000 young adults. When asked
about their favourite artists, many respondents
couldn’t answer, not through ambivalence but
because, it was concluded, “this generation is inter-
ested in so many music genres and artists.” It found
that while millennials are passionate about music
(76% within the 13- to 17-year-old bracket said they
wouldn’t be able to last a week without it), 79% of 13-
to 32-year-olds said their tastes didn’t fall into one
specific music genre. Just 11% said that they only
listened to one genre of music. “It seems,” Ypulse
noted when it published its findings, “that millennials
are a genre-less generation.” (Robinson 2016)
It is arguable that the musical tribes of earlier decades
have been merging together since the mid-1980s.
Hardcore has long shared an audience with hip-hop
heads, with the likes of the Beastie Boys who mutated
from hardcore to rap, Onyx who drew such audiences,
Death Grips who characterize themselves as hip-hop
but perform as if a hardcore band, and the skateboar-
ders who listen to both. Those most feted figureheads
of hip-hop purity tend to be those who have most
strongly incorporated jazz into their sound, from the
Roots to Mos Def to Kendrick Lamar, each artist often
performing with a live band of such musicians. And
artists like Travi$ Scott put on hyped performances
that evoke the energy of metal shows, with Cypress
Hill having long drawn in such mixed audiences. That
this hybridization of musical subgenres into a tribeless
aesthetic has now reached its epoch is reflected in the
line-ups of major music festivals around the world,
where a rapper is likely to share a stage with a rock
band and an EDM (Electronic Dance Music) artist.
Given that the aforementioned tribes—or subcul-
tures—have often delineated strict racial divisions, it
is easy to see why a tribeless youth culture can be
confused with the post-racial ideal of a “race-neutral
universalism.” A useful point of reference here is
Barry Jenkins’s 2008 film Medicine for Melancholy.
In one of its climactic scenes, its late-20-something
protagonist Micah (Wyatt Cenac), a member of the
generation previous to the millenials of Dope, spells
out his frustration with being an African-American
indie-kid in a subculture dominated by whites:
I mean is it any surprise that folks of color in the
scene date outside the race. Think about it,
everything about being “indie” is all tied to not
being black. . . . You can call it interracial dating,
but there’s nothing interracial about it. 9 out of 10
times, it’s somebody of color hanging on to a white
person. . . . You never see a black girl and an Asian
dude, you never see an Indian guy and a Latino girl
—it’s always one of us clinging on to one of them.5
Similarly, in What Are You Doing Here? A Black
Woman’s Life and Liberation in Heavy Metal (2012),
Canadian journalist Laine Dawes and her intervie-
wees—among them black musicians, journalists, and
academics across North America—recount the man-
ner in which they have found themselves having to
navigate the racial, and racially informed gender,
codes of the supposedly universal subculture of
metal. Given the recent dissolution of the sonic bor-
ders between such subcultures, however, some believe
that the corresponding racial barriers have also dis-
solved. For instance, another exemplar of such tribe-
lessness, the rapper Lil’ Wayne, considers the
sometimes white-dominated audiences of his live
shows as “clearly a message that there was no such
thing as racism” (Undisputed 2016). He goes on to
state: “When I’m coming out the bottom of the stage
at my show . . . and I open my eyes, and I see every-
body. I don’t have this type of crowd or that type of
crowd. My crowd has always been everybody, thank
God.” However, it is notable that, contrary to the
reporting of this interview online, Wayne actually
states that while his own experiences make him feel
that “I still believe it’s over,” he goes on to clarify that
“obviously, it isn’t.” It is the tribelessness of his audi-
ence, and his own lack of experience of interpersonal
racism, that makes him feel, contrary to the facts that
he recognizes, that racism is over; for this he con-
siders himself, somewhat unironically, “blessed.”
It is perhaps this tribelessness that makes Wayne
believe that the millenials’ attitude to race is such that
“it’s so not cool, it doesn’t even matter to them.” A
stance that Whittaker suggests is reflected in the
narrative of Dope: “You could take Rick’s story and
place it in any community because it’s about a kid
who doesn’t fit in, who wants to fit in, who’s trying to
figure out how he can succeed—how he can have a
normal life, enjoy himself and find a girl” (Open
Road Films 2015, 5). This kind of universalism very
much echoes post-racial rhetoric, as it suggests that
Malcolm’s story of struggle is not one impacted upon
his person as a young black man by various socio-
economic power structures, but is instead a personal
struggle related to the individual regardless of race or
race-related circumstance. However, while the
broader narrative structure of Dope conforms to a
generic story arc that has long served white film-
makers and mixed audiences, and the tribeless aes-
thetic of Dope’s protagonists resonates with post-
racial rhetoric in that its cultural signifiers are
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ostensibly free of racial coding, it will be seen how
Famuyiwa’s film communicates the persistence of
race within contemporary youth culture.
Tribeless, not post-racial: the black geek
Given the above conception of contemporary tribeless
youth culture, the nerd aesthetic of Malcolm and his
friends essentially defines current hipster fashion
trends, from the clothing to the retro video games.
Even the neighborhood gangsters share in some of the
nerd trio’s interests; one of the Bloods, a bully during
school hours, often robs Malcolm of his fashionable
vintage sneakers, elsewhere the local drug dealer, Dom
(A$AP Rocky), corrects Malcolm on his “golden age”
hip-hop history. However, despite all this, the trio’s
nerd status is emphasized in the movie as much as on
the film’s poster, whose tagline reads: “It’s Hard Out
Here for a Geek.” It is for their apparent nerdiness, for
instance, that Malcolm is repeatedly allowed to enter his
high school despite his rucksack, replete with MDMA
and a handgun, setting off the school’s metal detector
and riling the security officer’s sniffer dog. The officer, it
is suggested, cannot believe that such a nerd asMalcolm
would possibly be engaged in any criminal activity.
Walking in on Awreeoh’s rehearsals, the janitor, too,
clearly finds the protagonists to be cringe worthy. This
tension between the protagonists’ status as nerds and
the wider pop cultural understanding of nerds as hip-
sters is encapsulated by the narrator’s introduction to
Malcolm as a “geek.” For the attribution is given follow-
ing the teen’s explanation of Bitcoin—the virtual cur-
rency that is still probably best known for its use in the
trade of drugs and other illicit materials over the dark
web, which renders the innovation as not entirely nerdy
and, from an adolescent point of view, probably pretty
cool.
Contrary to Whittaker’s characterization of
Malcolm as a universal-outsider figure, I suggest that
the term “geek” as it is used in Famuyiwa’s film is what
ultimately undercuts the post-racial aesthetic of these
characters. I would suggest that the characterization of
Dope’s millenial protagonists as “geeks” is informed by
the racial experiences of the writer-director’s own gen-
eration, which is the same as that of both Jenkins and
Dawes, whose aforementioned works recount the
struggle to form heterogeneous identities in the face
of resistance from both white and black communities.
This is to say that here the term “geek” is founded on
principles of homogeneous racial construction—to
describe these characters as geeks is to question their
authenticity as “black.” After all, the name of their
band, Awreeoh, refers to the Oreo cookie (black on
the outside, white on the inside), while we recall that
their “plural interests” are deemed by their peers to be
“white shit.” This categorization of “geek,” then, is
informed by their being situated within a black
community that looks at them with distaste. For, as
Dawes (2012, 79) writes, “[s]haring certain common-
alities—like dialect, dress, dating, and music prefer-
ences—signifies to other blacks that you show pride
in who you are as a black person,” while holding
alternative interests indicates a rejection of this con-
ceived blackness. Dawes identifies an early origin of
this homogenous mindset in W.E.B. Du Bois’ 1903
essay “Of Our Spiritual Strivings,” which warns against
black persons “abandoning what they know to be their
true selves” through conformity with white culture,
while Greg Tate suggests the “fear of being consumed
by white American culture” goes back to the slave
experience (Dawes 2012, 81). As such, against the
majority view of hip-hop as “a suitable soundtrack
for black people,” an identity marker forged against
white American culture, “anyone who chooses not to
adopt those cultural signifiers for whatever reason”
finds that their “choice is seen as a rejection, even an
insult” toward the black community (Dawes 2012,
78–79).
In cinematic terms, the homogenization of black
identity would be enforced by the films of the New
Black Cinema, in which “[a]frocentrism and nationa-
listic pride often inform the aesthetic frameworks”
(Harris 2008, 52). In this cinema, Harris writes, “[w]
hat is culturally familiar—hip-hop, rap music, com-
modified neo-nationalism and the cool, posed,
‘endangered black man’—becomes representationally
and culturally totalized as the Black Experience of the
young, heterosexual urban black man, the only
experience possible.” As such, the “homogeneous,
monolithic, and culturally familiar” signifiers of the
black community—and, in particular, black masculi-
nity—mean that those black males who do not con-
form to the image are deemed to be outliers; deviant
and disappointing.
I suggest that the use of the term “geek” in Dope is
a substitution of previous exemplars of deviancy from
the described representational norms, such as
homosexuality.6 And it is in this way that the con-
ceptual conceit of the film is very much contradictory
to post-racial ideology, where race is deemed irrele-
vant to one’s treatment and experiences—in Dope it is
specifically race that shapes the characters’ identity as
“geeks” and their own awareness of it. Further, this
racial consciousness counters any pretensions toward
conceiving tribeless youth culture as equivalent to the
kind of universality posited in post-racial discourse, a
universality which is not so much a neutral “equality”
as it is an assimilation into “white” culture.7 It is the
representation of, and self consciousness concerning,
black culture that underpins the film, in a manner
which succeeds in upending what Denzin identifies as
the ultimately conservative conventions of the homo-
geneous black identity established through much of
the New Black Cinema.
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Though praising the filmmaking craft and inten-
tions of film such as Boyz N the Hood (1991), New
Jack City (1991), and Menace II Society (1993),
Denzin (2002, 115) points out that such films suc-
cumb to the issue that
is always the risk of the social problems text. In
drawing attention to the hood and its problems,
these movies reinforced white racist criticisms of
blacks in America today. In doing so they reassured
white and black middle-class audiences that their
identities were stable, and their stances towards
race and the hood were correct.
Certain conventions of these New Black Cinema films
would result in this backfire of intent. One was the
establishment of a new black masculinity that privi-
leged the importance of male guidance and responsi-
bility in the family, which in turn diminished the
historically recognized role of African-American
women as breadwinner and single parent (Denzin
2002, 120). Another was the films’ critique of the
1980s crack epidemic, intended to raise awareness
and offer solutions, but which, “in the public imagi-
nation, . . . became part of a national moral panic
surrounding crack-cocaine, gang drug wars, and
racial genocide in the ghetto” (Denzin 2002, 112).
Further, the didacticism of some of these films,
intended to provide solutions for the black commu-
nity to rise above the violence depicted, instead ended
up “reproducing conservative myths about indivi-
duals who get out by luck and hard work,” that
“[w]hile some responsibility for the hood and its
problems must be located in the apparatuses of a
racist society, black men and black women still
make their own problems. The media are not invent-
ing these problems” (Denzin 2002, 119). In this
respect, what Pharrell Williams more recently pro-
claimed to be an original concept of “the New
Black”—“The New Black dreams and realizes that
it’s not pigmentation: it’s a mentality, and it’s either
going to work for you or it’s going to work against
you. And you’ve got to pick the side you’re going to
be on,”—is actually the old black of the New Black
Cinema (Williams 2015).
Dope, the film Williams executively produced, on
the other hand, actually works to subvert these nega-
tives of the New Black Cinema on all three counts. As
Famuyiwa himself puts it:
I wanted to use the expectations that people have of
characters like these and the conventions of the
genre that I think people are familiar with when
they think about films like this, whether it’s Boyz n
the Hood or Menace II Society or Friday. We’ve been
trained in a certain way to assume how these char-
acters will interact with each other, how they live and
who they are. (Meraji 2015)
With regard to conceptions of masculinity, we are
told that Malcolm has only one memory of his
Nigerian father, and it is his receiving a package
containing a photo of the two from when he was
younger, a note stating “My favorite movie! Happy
Birthday Son,” and a VHS copy of Gordon Parks Jr’s
1972 blaxploitation film Super Fly. One can conceive
of this joke as a dig at the black masculinity promoted
by the New Black Cinema which, “unable to engage
the conflict and contradictions of the 1990s black
masculine” that emerged in the post-Rodney King/
O.J. Simpson verdict era, “fell into redundancy simi-
lar to Blaxploitation” (Harris 2008, 62).
In regard to a supposed hard drugs culture among
the black community, it is notable that the dope in
question, Molly, or MDMA, is a far cry from the
crack-cocaine depicted in the urban gangster films
described earlier. As Diggy points out: “We’re talking
Molly, not heroin. All we gotta do is find the white
people. Go to Coachella, Lollapalooza . . .” Here the
trio are dealing with a party drug rather than a sub-
stance that could ravage the community, and to
further distance the protagonists, and the film, from
the cycle of movies that reinforced public fears of drug
wars in the ghetto, Famuyiwa even has his characters
use the internet to sell the drugs. As Malcolm puts it:
“We don’t have to stand on any corner.”
It is in respect to the last negative of the New Black
Cinema, the leveling of responsibility for the problems
within the black community, that we find that
Famuyiwa’s film again undercuts post-racial ideology.
For Dope works to highlight the structural racism that
obstructs African-Americans from achieving social
mobility. These kids may be tribeless, but they’re never-
theless divided by the circumstances of their reality.
Malcolm’s first attempt at a personal statement for
his application to Harvard is a paper entitled: “30
November 1988—A Research Thesis to Discover Ice
Cube’s Good Day.” Malcolm believes this is a good
idea as he’s “talking about something that I love. I
mean it’s well reasoned, supported with historical
data, it shows creativity, critical thinking. If Neil
deGrasse Tyson was writing about Ice Cube, this is
what it would look like.”8 Dismissing his school advi-
sor’s advice to write about his actual life—character-
ized by Malcolm as “from a poor, crime-filled,
neighborhood, raised by a single mother, don’t know
my dad, blah, blah. . . it’s cliché”—the African-
American teacher, Mr. Bailey (Bruce Beatty), tells him:
I’m going to be honest with you. You’re pretty damn
arrogant. Think you’re gonna get into Harvard? Who
do you think you are, hm? You go to high school in
Inglewood. To the admissions committee, your straight
As, they don’t mean shit. . . . It’s going to be about your
personal statement, your SAT scores, your recommen-
dations [pointing to himself], and, most importantly,
your alumni interview tomorrow—are you ready?
Creativity and individuality are irrelevant, it is sug-
gested—it is instead the purely formal process of
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recorded capability and the networking component
of the recommendations that will give Malcolm a
chance to attend college. However, while Bailey is
probably right, in the context of the film’s dialogue
with the New Black Cinema the reprimand takes on
another layer: the student advisor fills the role found
in such movies of the enemy in black skin; the racist
black cop in Boyz N the Hood, for instance. In this
respect, that Bailey’s advice is ultimately correct, yet
is communicated in a villainous manner, suggests
that it is the structure of American education itself,
rather than the black student advisor, that is charac-
terized here in the negative. This system, the scene
suggests, is one that encourages black students to aim
for a sympathy vote rather than to express their
precocious intelligence, to present themselves as
impoverished rather than innovative. This, then,
may seem a critique of affirmative-action programs,
another aspect that would align this film with post-
racial discourse, where such progressive policies are
deemed to undermine the legal standing of equality
in the US by “discriminating” against white people.9 I
would disagree with such a reading, however, as the
film gives us an exemplar of Bailey’s advice in the
form of white slacker Will Sherwood (Blake
Anderson), who we are told by the narrator spent
his teenage years in prep school:
where he smoked a pound of weed a week, skipped
classes, and had a 1.9 GPA. Yet got a perfect score in
his SAT. He was accepted to his father’s alma mater
under academic probation, which meant he had to
maintain a 3.0 grade point average. So William
hacked into the [censored] database erasing all the
grades of the entire freshman class.
What the film is suggesting then is not so much that
affirmative-action is a bad thing, but that the aca-
demic system itself is flawed, resting all of its focus on
specific hoops to be jumped through—one particular
exam (“a perfect score in his SAT”), recommenda-
tions of a certain caliber (“his father’s alma mater”)—
rather than the consistency of intelligence (“your
straight As”) and the creativity of students who may
not be able to satisfy these specific requirements for
various external factors. After all, it is the attempt to
satisfy these conditions, and the derailment of such
an attempt by the external forces of Malcolm’s neigh-
borhood, that drives the narrative of Dope—the drugs
just facilitate our insight into the structural issues that
obstruct students from impoverished backgrounds to
succeed.
When the drugs enter the picture, the manner in
which students may become straitjacketed by their
environment emerges. Told by Jib to dump the bag
off at the police station, Malcolm emphasizes the
absurdity of wanting “three niggas with a bag of
dope—and a gun—to go to the fucking police station.”
Malcolm is offered a way out by the drug dealer, Dom,
who tells him to drop the bag off at the “Boys’ Club.”
Located in a plusher part of Inglewood, Malcolm
nearly succeeds in returning the drugs until chaos
ensues, and he has to split for his alumni interview.
Sitting in the office of Austin Jacoby, Malcolm spies
Dom in a framed photo titled “Teen Enrichment
Program of Los Angeles,” followed by a photo of the
spoilt siblings encountered at the mansion he had just
departed. Malcolm thus realizes that his alumni inter-
viewer is in fact the head of the “Boys’ Club.” An
established businessman, Malcolm is expected to gain
a recommendation to Harvard from this drug kingpin
of Inglewood. The choice of casting Guenveur Smith
in this role is significant—described by Thembi Ford
(2008) as “Spike Lee’s ‘color consciousness muse,’” the
African-American actor is light-skinned enough to
suggest that it is only by smudging away one’s ethnic
edges that one can succeed in a white-dominated
society.10 Yet as he is presented as a corrupt figure
within the narrative such a concealment of one’s racial
identity is also signified as negative, in contrast to the
film’s hero who is self-designated as “black as fuck.”
Further critiquing the credibility of an education sys-
tem that places such weight upon recommendations,
Famuyiwa has Jacoby rescheduling the interview for a
few weeks—by which time he expects Malcolm to have
sold all the drugs and brought him the money: “If
you’re able to do this it shows me more about you
than any interview ever could. I would then make it
my business to make you a man of Harvard. I want
you to get out of the Bottoms, just like I did.”
This encounter is followed by a ride home on his
mother’s bus, wherein Malcolm daydreams various
figures of his life—both loved and feared—as Gil
Scott-Heron sings “Home Is Where the Hatred Is.”
Here the obstructions of gang-life, murder, and cor-
ruption infiltrate the very system of academia itself,
presenting a vicious circle that closes in—tighter.
Contrary to the conservative sentiment of the New
Black Cinema identified by Denzin, then, the
Bottoms is presented in a manner that lives up to its
name, as a place where not even “luck and hard work”
are enough for an individual to rise above the obstacles
to their social mobility. It is in this respect that
Malcolm’s outlandish journey to the end of the college
application also differs from the comedy it most
obviously evokes: Reginald Hudlin’s House Party
(1990). Hudlin’s movie similarly presents its protago-
nists as good kids up against the criminal elements of
their neighborhood; however this struggle is presented
within a middle-class milieu. Harris (2008, 55–56)
reads House Party as “a very deliberate film” with
which, by touching on “signs of the ‘black familiar,’
and inverting them, the Hudlins construct a cinematic
portrait of a utopian, ‘imagined community,’ inventing
the visual meaning of a nation of black people, in
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which the stereotypes are supplanted . . . with revised,
‘positive’ images.” Famuyiwa, on the other hand, does
not attempt to hide the harsh realities of certain sec-
tors of the African-American milieu and instead
skewers them through comedy. This approach is
sometimes successful, as when a diner shootout erupts
after a cross-purpose argument over “lunch,” and
sometimes incongruent, as when another restaurant
shooting finds a geek acquaintance killed within the
cross-fire, the narrator telling us that “the real tragedy
is he was seconds away from defeating Ganon” on his
blood-stained Game Boy. Irrespective of issues of tone,
the daily dangers of life in (some) parts of Inglewood
are nevertheless here portrayed in the film. And, con-
trary to the conservative sentiment of post-racial ideol-
ogy, the film highlights the importance of recognizing
the social and institutional power structures that dis-
enfranchise marginal groups.
New black media
Contrary to Lil Wayne’s experience of white-domi-
nated crowds making him feel that “racism is over,”
recent accounts from black record label employees,
music journalists, and musicians report on the “white
micro-aggressions” experienced at venues where one
comes to be, and is sometimes made to be, aware of
being “a black woman in an overwhelmingly white
place”11 (Kambasha 2016). That the proposed tribe-
lessness is still affirmed, however, is seen in how
Kambasha no longer thinks to herself “what are you
doing here?” as with Dawes, but instead firmly argues
“why I belong.” What is suggested, then, is that
though youth culture has become tribeless—for here
the black author feels she belongs to the once white-
coded subculture of indie—in practice, as with post-
racialism itself, this has mostly been to the benefit of
white persons. This is to say that while white persons
have been given full access to previously ethnically
coded subcultures such as hip-hop, nonwhite ethni-
cities still find themselves restricted from supposedly
white-coded subcultural spaces.
Dope doesn’t place its characters into any such
spaces, though, as stated, highlights how certain fes-
tivals such as Coachella and Lollapalooza are where
to “find the white people,” despite their culturally and
ethnically mixed line-ups. Instead, Dope further
undercuts post-racial rhetoric by showing how the
characters create their own space, such that they
don’t need to “cling” to white people to affirm their
alignment with subcultures of different kinds. This
forging of their own space is communicated meta-
phorically through the montage in which Malcolm
stands at a microphone and delivers his climactic
monologue directly to the camera, with Jib and
Diggy beside him and behind their instruments.
Each shot finds the band placed at various locations
in Inglewood; the geeks no longer outsiders to the
area but having carved their own territory within it.
What informs this creation of a space for them-
selves is their creative use of web-based technologies.
The web is presented as permeating the Bottoms as
much as it does everywhere else in urban and sub-
urban America. Stumbling upon a gang of Blood
members filming a video for their YouTube channel,
showing off the retro trainer they stole from
Malcolm, Jib comments that someone “needs to cre-
ate an app, like ways to avoid these hood traps.”
Elsewhere, Dom’s rival dealers use an iPad to track
Malcolm via the mobile in his drug-filled rucksack:
“Find an iPhone—Steve Jobs is a muthafucking gen-
ius.” After a local TV news report of Lily (Chanel
Iman) peeing on the street, high on their supply, goes
viral, along with mobile phone footage of Awreeoh’s
performance at a party similarly fueled by their
MDMA, the two become conflated by those within
their social network. The drug commonly known as
“Molly” is renamed “Lily,” and the meme results in
the rocketing of the Bitcoin sales of their stash. And it
is due to his creative use of the internet that Malcolm
ultimately extracts himself from the situation he has
found himself in. Malcolm, delivering the 10% cash
profit of the drug deals, tells Jacoby that the rest is
stored as Bitcoin currency—and that Malcolm has
been using Jacoby’s own shipping and bank accounts
to deliver the drugs to customers. Having implicated
the businessman in the illegal dealings, Malcolm
gains the vantage point in a situation that was once
non-negotiable; one which ensures protection for his
loved ones and a recommendation for Harvard.
That the USB Malcolm uses to make his Bitcoin
transactions takes the visage of a boombox stereo is
significant here. The image of the boombox partly
speaks to Malcolm’s obsession with golden age hip-
hop culture, but it also relates to the representational
difference between the African-American teens pre-
sented in this film and those presented in the New
Black Cinema. As Harris (2008) puts it, the black
masculinities of the latter “operat[e] referentially to
the popular cultural images of black men which are
visibly recurring, or simply fixed, instructing homo-
genous, monolithic, and culturally familiar (and
therefore, quite culturally consumable) constructs.”
Among these images of the “culturally familiar” is
that of the boombox, “a combined radio and cassette
player that was high-quality, high-powered, stereo-
phonic, and portable,” and which is frequently asso-
ciated with hip-hop culture/aesthetics and rap music
(Schloss and Boyer 2014, 401). Schloss and Boyer
(2014, 400 and 408) write that “[f]or approximately
ten years, roughly spanning the decade of the 1980s,
the boombox was nearly ubiquitous in popular cul-
ture,” and highlight how its employment in Spike
Lee’s Do the Right Thing (1989) demonstrates “the
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subtle interplay between cooperative listening and
contested listening” related to the device, as well as
providing “a nuanced representation of the political
dimensions of sound for certain black communities
in New York.” Lee’s character of Radio Raheem (Bill
Nunn), whose “entire essence can be described in
three words: ‘man with boombox’,” traverses the var-
ious sociopolitical territories that constitute the space
of the film in a manner that demonstrates how “the
boombox was a tool with which an African American
youth could challenge his assigned role in society, not
only along racial lines, but also with regard to gen-
eration, class, ethnicity and arguably even gender”
(Schloss and Boyer 2014, 407–8). This is because
Raheem’s use of the boombox as “a miniature public
address system,” with its blasting of Public Enemy’s
politically charged song “Fight the Power,” and his
engaging with “competing boombox owners deter-
mined to find out who had the superior machine
and therefore the right to claim the area,” reflects
the use of the boombox in reality; the boombox as
an “apparatus” that establishes a network between
various heterogeneous sets of discourses (Schloss
and Boyer 2014, 404–5 and 400). Under this analysis,
the boombox is understood as a way of actively con-
testing “received notions of social space,” for “by
using sound to take control of their immediate envir-
onment at any given moment, [such users] are simul-
taneously creating a liberated zone (from their point
of view) and colonizing the space (from the point of
view of those who previously controlled it)” (Schloss
and Boyer 2014, 406). Raheem himself becomes a
mobile zone of both sound and power in his creation
of a space for himself. In this respect, we note that
Raheem meets his death minutes after another char-
acter destroys his boombox.
It is notable that Famuyiwa’s film closes with a
credit sequence that somewhat mirrors Spike Lee’s
opening credit sequence to Do the Right Thing, in
which Rosie Perez, seemingly out of character, dances
on a theater stage whose backdrop is a painted car-
icature of the actual Brooklyn block that the film’s
events will unfold before. The artificiality of this
sequence makes it feel like a music video, just as the
retro faux-VHS aesthetic of Dope’s closing images of
Malcolm performing various nineties dance moves in
a myriad of Inglewood locations abstracts it from the
movie’s actual narrative. However, if these sequences
mirror one another, it is through a funhouse distor-
tion; where Perez is furiously shadow boxing to the
soundtrack of “Fight the Power,” Malcolm is grinning
and gurning as he does the running man to Digital
Underground’s “The Humpty Dance.” This distorted
semblance is another way in which Famuyiwa distin-
guishes his characters and film from those “expecta-
tions” established by the popular African-American
cinema of the late 1980s and early 1990s, but what is
more important is the way in which the conception of
space in these films has shifted from the physical
territories of the boombox to the electronic rhizome
of the internet signified by Malcolm’s boombox USB.
Beyond the dialogue with earlier African-American
cinema, in its equation of hip-hop signifiers and the
internet, the film points toward web space as provid-
ing a site for minority youth to claim a space of
power for themselves.12 And the utilization of the
web for the subversion of the structures that oppress
young African-Americans in Dope resonates with
broader shifts in recent black culture.
One subversion relates to the earlier described break
with homogeneous conceptions of “black” identity, for
the tribeless aesthetic of Famuyiwa’s characters is argu-
ably the result of the millennial generation’s exposure to
a broader range of music via the web. Where Schloss
and Boyer (2014, 409–10) consider the demise of the
boombox as the loss of the “public space [as] a site of
collective listening” that ran parallel with “a cultural
turn toward self-centeredness: American society
became more individualistic and controlled,” Dawes
(2012, 78) points out how the “family stereo” was a
major source for the homogeneity of black identities.
“Thanks to portable music players and wireless laptops,
parents have less control over what their children are
listening to,” and, exposed to the wider range of music
available online, the millennial generation is in turn
exposed to broader conceptions of the self. This has
been demonstrated by the Afro-Punk movement,
which emerged via the 2003 documentary film of the
same name and resulted in the forging of spaces for a
wider community through the establishment of an asso-
ciated website and message board. As the film’s director
James Spooner recalls:
That film seemed like a manifesto for all of these
people. [People] were calling and identifying them-
selves as afropunks. I remember “afropunk” being
used as an adjective and being like “No, no, no,
we’re doing the thing we were fighting against.”
Eventually, I just had to like succumb because it
belonged to everybody. Clearly the people who
were saying that needed to identify as or with. For
the first three or four years, the film was all there
was. There were parties, but it was the film that
created a safe space for those parties to happen.
(Kameir 2015)
With Matthew Morgan, Spooner would found the
2005 Afro-Punk festival in Brooklyn, New York, a
musical endeavor which has since been hosted at
various sites across the US, as well as in the UK and
France. Reporting on the London Afro-Punk festival
of 24 September 2016, Leonie Cooper (2016) writes
that its message is loud and clear on the banners
beside the stage: “No sexism. No racism. No ableism.
No ageism. No homophobia. No fatphobia. No trans-
phobia. No hatefulness.” And if the “safe spaces” of
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Afro-Punk align with the forging of Malcolm, Jib,
and Diggy’s own spaces by the end of Famuyiwa’s
film, it is because both emphasize the importance of
the internet in creating such breaks from existing
racial structures. It is the innovation of this impover-
ished student, Malcolm’s manipulation of power
structures via the alternative structures of the inter-
net, both Dark Web (for the sale of the drugs) and
mainstream (viral advertising of his product), that
ultimately gets him into Harvard, rather than the
specific requirements of one test and a set of recom-
mendations; those requirements so often made diffi-
cult by the social forces and political systems post-
racial ideologues wish to deny exist. And it is here
argued that Malcolm’s subversion of racially striating
power structures resonates with what might be called
“New Black Media”—the utilization of the web best
exemplified by the experiments and travails of Tidal.
In keeping with the tribeless tastes of the millennials,
Tidal’s highly publicized launch event presented it as a
streaming service co-owned by artists as diverse as
Kanye West, Jack White, Deadmau5, Madonna, Daft
Punk, and Coldplay. However, the site was initially
acquired by Shawn “Jay Z” Carter, and it’s most vocal
proponents certainly regard it as an African-American
endeavor. For instance, in her critique of racism within
the music industry, co-owner Nicki Minaj (2015)
responded to derisive commentary of the streaming
site, stating: “Taylor [Swift] took her music off Spotify
and was applauded. We launched Tidal & were
dragged.” As Diana Ozemebhoya Eromosele (2015)
puts it, Minaj
articulated a legitimate paranoia held by many
blacks: the idea that the powers that be will always
try to trivialize, nitpick or sabotage the efforts of
black people who are trying to amass real wealth.
I’m not talking about getting rich; I’m talking wealth
with a capital “W.” Bill Gates wealth. Steve Jobs
wealth. Black people who are trying to create the
next Facebook, Apple or Twitter—or launch a
music-streaming service like Spotify.
At a time when corporate streaming services—
Spotify, YouTube, iTunes—offer minute royalties to
the artists who attract the users that make these
companies millions, the importance of Tidal is that
it gives African-American artists full control over the
distribution of their art, and the financial benefits
that come with it.13
Production has never been much of a problem for
hip-hop artists, given its beginnings in the depression
battered South Bronx of the 1970s, but distribution has
been. For instance, in the early 1990s, there was the
censorship that found some record stores refusing to
stock products bearing the Parents Resource Music
Centre advisory sticker many rap records were made
to carry (Potts 2016). More significantly, G. Thomas
Wilson (2001, 106) outlines how, across several
decades, the policies of the Federal Communications
Commission, combined with the “Economic
Development Administration, lending institutions,
and advertisers’ policies and practices, have, in general,
discouraged the sustained growth rate of Black and
other minority ownership of broadcast stations.” The
Telecommunications Act 1996 was especially impor-
tant, for though its “amendments were worded as inclu-
sive documents,” in practice this major deregulation of
US media ownership allowed corporate “group owners
enough capacity to absorb “failed”minority-owned sta-
tions (without “mergers”with theminority owners) and
to accommodate those minority- and nonminority-
owned stations acquired through hostile takeover”
(Wilson 2001, 95 and 103). The output of such stations
became constrained by corporate governance, resulting
in the abandonment of community programming and
the marginalizing of musicians who would air political
views from within an independent space:
For stations like KMEL-FM in the Bay Area, whom
prided themselves on being a “people’s station” by
engaging in social issues affecting the San Francisco
community, this meant being bought out and
merged with competing stations; playlists became
nearly identical, specialty shows were cut, local per-
sonalities were fired, and local or underground
artists “unable to compete with six-figure major
label marketing budgets” were left without a venue.
(Ide 2013)
Derek Ide (2013) conceives of this corporate consoli-
dation of the media as “facilitat[ing] the crystallization
of apolitical, socially devoid gangsta rap into main-
stream pop culture,” as against the autonomy and
range of critical black voices that had emerged via
independent record labels and the independent radio
stations that would play their tracks. It is important to
consider how Black Entertainment Television (BET)
figures within this context, for as a major media cor-
poration in its own right—the first black owned com-
pany to be listed on the stock exchange no less—
Robert L. Johnson’s BET Holdings, Inc. survived the
adverse effects of the 1996 Act (Barber and Tait 2001,
117). Barber and Tait describe BET’s expansion by the
end of the ‘90s as encompassing publishing, restau-
rants, banking, and new communication and informa-
tion industries. Yet BET did not enter the field of
radio, even though music videos made for 77% of its
Black Entertainment Television network’s program-
ming (Barber and Tait 2001, 114). Given that it was
their already broad African-American audience that
was BET’s major draw to such white-dominated cor-
porate partners as Telecommunications, Inc. and
Time-Warner, Inc., it appears Johnson was more
interested in brand expansion rather than his com-
pany’s merging (or at least absorption) of smaller
minority-run radio and TV stations, given that their
audiences may have already comprised, or competed
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with, part of BET’s own. Following Ide’s line of
thought, and given that BET’s audience was at that
time 60% non-African American, BET would thus be
one such limited avenue of distribution that would
result in the homogenizing of hip-hop culture into a
form of mainstream pop; an apolitical commodity
(Barber and Tait 2001, 112).
Tidal, I suggest, demonstrates a new approach to
the distribution of African-American art and culture,
one which takes advantage of the internet in order to
gain independence from the kind of white-dominated
corporations BET relied upon. Emmanuel K.
Ngwainmbi (2005) argues that the internet has his-
torically aided black entrepreneurs due to the relative
inexpensiveness of setting up and running an e-busi-
ness, and the avoidance of the “financial (capital
incursion) difficulties” related to credit histories and
loan applications that traditionally restricted minority
business owners in the United States. (Though it
should be noted that the costs of running a streaming
site are astronomical, and it is the artist-owners’
already accrued wealth that allowed for their invest-
ment in the case of Tidal.14)
While its first year of trading as an artist-owned
enterprise had found Tidal suffering a loss of $28
million (Verbergt and Gauthier-Villars 2016), and
the botched release of the latest Rihanna album in
January 2016 found one music publication going so
far as to characterize the project as “tragicomic,” it
was just weeks later that the true potential of Tidal
was revealed (Noisey Staff 2016). On 14 February
2016, Kanye West’s The Life of Pablo was released
for exclusive streaming on Tidal, with its album cover
bearing the intriguing, and repeated, statement of:
“WHICH/ONE” beneath its similarly repeated title.
While the statement plays upon the title—which
Pablo, Escobar or Picasso or Paul; which life, that of
decadence or art or God—it also plays upon the form
of the album itself. Describing the project as “living
breathing changing creative expression” West had
come up with a way of making streaming essential,
for he would be constantly updating the album
(Doyle 2016), with new versions of the tracks, and
sometimes new additions entirely, being uploaded as
he saw fit (Jenkins 2016). This project both harnessed
the possibilities of art in the age of the internet—
when music can be distributed without the con-
straints of physical production, why not keep the
track list fluid?—and also managed to make Tidal’s
relatively high subscription costs worth paying for,
given that any pirated download would soon become
out of date, leaving the listener missing out on a
record still in process.
Earlier that month, Beyoncé had issued a pro-
vocative video for her song “Formation.”
Reflecting upon the video’s various perspectives
on “the black experience in America in 2016,”
the New York Times describes “Formation” as
“among the most politically direct work [Beyoncé
has] done in her career, with implicit commentary
on police brutality, Hurricane Katrina and black
financial power” (Caramaca, Morris, and
Wortham 2016). Though garnering much publi-
city—whether positive or negative, as in the case
of those who considered the video to be antipolice
and “racist” for highlighting state discrimination
against African-Americans, in keeping with the
post-racial discourse described above—it is nota-
ble that though the video was made available on
both the subscription based Tidal and the free-to-
access YouTube, in the case of the latter it was
uploaded in an unlisted format (Shaw 2016). This
meant that one could not search for the video on
YouTube itself and so could only initially access
the video via a link on the artist’s website (Weiss
2016). As with West’s Pablo project, here Beyoncé
demonstrates a strategy for directing the flow of
web traffic, money, and discourse itself. If right-
wing critics want to spit venom at her art, they
would have to pay her to gain access to it in the
first place.
Both records eventually wound up being sold on
Apple’s iTunes store, which demonstrates the limita-
tions of such approaches—the artists presumably
needed a wider mainstream audience to embrace
their records in order to make the associated arena
tours possible. It is also notable that while this strat-
egy of exclusivity may work for already successful
artists, it is the opposite approach—that of free access
via the internet—that has helped to establish upcom-
ing African-American artists. The aforementioned
Odd Future, for instance, gained listeners, concert
and festival bookings, and major press coverage,
through their choice to release a number of mixtapes
online as free downloads (Gopalan, 2011). However,
following their early, self-made, success, the various
members of the group would sign album contracts
with various record labels, including Odd Future
Records, founded in 2011 by the group’s figurehead
of Tyler, the Creator as an imprint of Sony Music.
The draw of established record labels was once their
distribution power, in this case Sony’s subsidiaries of
RED Distribution and then Columbia Records, but
when the artists have demonstrably harnessed this
power for themselves via their creative use of the
internet it seems redundant to have their royalties
siphoned off by major corporations. The Tidal
model, which came a few years later, is one that offers
a far better deal to these millennial artists who find
fame on the internet in the first instance in any case.
It is in this respect that I suggest the recent Tidal
releases mark early steps toward a new media strategy
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of black entrepreneurship, one by which the direction
of both profits and discourse are directed by the
artists themselves.
Returning to Famuyiwa’s film, I would suggest that
the production itself could be conceived of as partak-
ing in the broader economic strategy described above.
For along with Whittaker’s Significant Productions,
Dope was co-produced by the new media nodes of i
am OTHER and Revolt TV. The former is run by
Pharrell Williams, and its YouTube page states that it
is: “dedicated to Thinkers, Innovators, and Outcasts.
By celebrating creative people and pursuits of all
kinds, we showcase architects of global culture,
music, fashion, and the arts” (Staff 2015a). The latter
is run by hip-hop entrepreneur Sean “P. Diddy”
Combs, and describes itself as:
focused on expertly curating the best of the best in
music and engaging youth in social conversation, the
multi-genre, multi-platform network offers breaking
music news, videos, artist interviews, exclusive per-
formances, and original programming. Attracting
over 50 million young adults through television,
digital properties, social and mobile, REVOLT is
accessible 24/7—anytime, anywhere, any screen.
(Staff 2015b)
Aside from the initial financing, Famuyiwa’s engage-
ment with these two companies has been of much
help in promoting the movie to an alternative audi-
ence of music and fashion lovers, where mainstream
cinema audiences may otherwise gloss over a small
comedy starring unknown African-American actors
as kids in a “ghetto.”15 Open Road Film’s distribu-
tion of Dope found it placed in the theaters of AMC
Entertainment and Regal Entertainment Group (the
two major cinema chains that own Open Road), but
given that this is not enough to guarantee the suc-
cess of similarly budgeted movies on their roster, we
can consider the promotion on these dedicated sites
of Revolt TV and i am OTHER, along with their
associated social media profiles, to have helped the
$7 million budgeted film to gross over $17 million in
the US.16 By directing the flow of web traffic and of
discourse around their art to a racially diverse audi-
ence, the distribution of Dope partakes in a broader
strategy by African-American artists that finds them
exploiting the post-racial rhetoric of films and
sounds for all, while simultaneously undercutting
the very real racial structures that would ordinarily
limit their profit-base.
The endeavors of the African-American culture-
makers cited above—Tidal, Pharrell, Combs, et al—
may not aim for the redistribution of their wealth,
their operations very much embodying neoliberal indi-
vidualism, but the point is that they were never meant
to benefit from the politics of neoliberal colorblind-
ness. The Telecommunications Act 1996 is just one
instance among others whereby proponents of
neoliberal individualism support supposedly color-
blind policies that disenfranchise minority commu-
nities by minimizing state support and allowing for
wider privatization (Omi and Winant 2014). Without
such supporting infrastructures, minority communities
largely fail to benefit from this burgeoning free-market
as they are unable to access it from their impoverished
position within the sociopolitical framework of the US.
In this article, however, we have seen how African-
American artists are subverting the politics of neolib-
eral colorblindness intended to suppress and limit the
thriving of nonwhite Americans; these artists draw on
its aesthetic of post-racialism in order to carve a space
of power for themselves.
Conclusion
Rick Famuyiwa’s Dope resonates with a broader
moment in African-American pop culture that is
informed by, and a reaction to, notions of post-
racial universalism. In particular, it has been seen
how Famuyiwa’s film both demonstrates that racial
barriers are very much in effect within a youth
culture that is now largely tribeless, and how the
film’s social media infused content and distribution
reflects new media strategies taken by African-
American artists to direct the discourse and profit
concerning their art within still white-dominated
industries. As a site of convergence, it is not sug-
gested here that all of these resonances of the text
were intended by the writer-director in order to
produce the specific points identified. Instead,
Dope is an instance, among many others across
various fields of art, in which a work may speak
to broader movements in culture; the circuit
between text, culture-makers, and society creating
a site of intensity, of various forces that determine
its substance and effects.
Notes
1. See Casey Brienza. 2013. “Beyond B&W? The Global
Manga of Felipe Smith,” Black Comics: Politics of
Race and Representation. Edited by Sheena C.
Howard and Ronald L. Jackson II. London:
Bloomsbury. Glover has more recently found nota-
ble success with his excellent, idiosyncratic, televi-
sion series Atlanta (2016).
2. N.E.R.D is an acronym for Nobody Ever Really Dies
—arguably a sci-fi trope if there ever was one, as
Thomas Pynchon (2000) has pointed out: “when the
space and time have been altered to allow characters
to travel easily anywhere through the continuum
and thus escape physical dangers and timepiece
inevitabilities, mortality is so seldom an issue.”
3. In 2013, Kanye West would spit scorn on his earlier
persona: “Pink-ass polos with a fucking backpack/
But everybody know you brought real rap back”
(West 2013).
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4. Thorpe (2011) cites comments from Jeremy Pritchard,
of alternative rock band Everything Everything, on
this matter: “before the internet, when I was becoming
aware of music, there was quite a limited selection
available. . . . But our lead singer, Jonathan Higgs, led
the way on this for us, really. He liked all that R&B,
but he also liked Blur and Radiohead and Nirvana. I
hope that, just as the Beatles had their ear to the
ground with black American music, we are doing a
similar thing on a small scale because we like listening
to Drake and Rihanna.”
5. The drunken stuttering and reiteration of phrases by
the character has been edited out for clarity.
6. It should be noted that the character of Diggy is openly
queer, yet her sexuality doesn’t pose any issues for her
within the film. There is a brief comic flashback that
finds her dolled up in a dress as a church congregation
attempts an exorcism at her grandmother’s request,
but even that sequence ends with Diggy eyeing the legs
of one of her tormentors, demonstrating the charac-
ter’s confidence concerning her sexuality.
7. For instance, consider Gregg Araki’s discussion of racial
casting for his 1992 film Totally F**ked Up: “The parts
are not written in any sort of ethnic way. Their ethnicity
was completely interchangeable. The ethnicity of the
characters was like wardrobe, essentially . . ., all the
characters are totally assimilated into the ‘white’ culture,
as I am. [The half-Asian lead] is not different culturally
than of the other characters. He doesn’t have all the
kind of ‘identifiers’. . . . He doesn’t eat with chopsticks,
and he doesn’t take his shoes off when he comes into the
house. He’s like all the other kids, he talks about sex and
drugs, music, whatever. . . . I have this thing about film-
makers who are very race specific, what I view as a kind
of reverse-discriminatory, elitist view of race. And they
make movies that are wholly Asian-American, or
African-American. And I think that those films are
ultimately boring and retrogressive. And really destruc-
tive. In my own life, race is not really an issue. . . . These
black films or Asian films or Latin films, where there are
Asians and Asians and blacks and blacks, are represen-
tative of a separatist attitude. . . . Personally, I don’t like
blacks who hang out with blacks because those are the
only people that relate to them, and that they feel at
home with. That’s racism in a bad way.” The sugges-
tions of racism and reverse discrimination here align
Araki’s thoughts with contemporary post-racial dis-
course and the notion that highlighting race, or the
importance of race to one’s identity, somehow under-
mines equality. But, most interestingly, Araki also
acknowledges that his model for universalism is
“white” culture (Chua 1992).
8. One assumes that in theworld of the film, skateboarder
and comedian Donovan Strain (2012) hadn’t already
written his blog post pinpointing the exact day referred
to in Ice Cube’s 1993 rap song “A Good Day.”
9. Laws that aim to benefit disenfranchised groups are
characterized by post-racial ideologues as “partial
and divisive, and benefiting primarily those with
‘special interests’ versus all Americans,” which thus
“injures whites in order to benefit people of color”
(Cho 2008–2009, 1602).
10. “[I]n films such as Malcolm X, Do The Right Thing,
and Get on the Bus . . . Smith’s racial ambiguity is used
to to [sic] highlight racial tensions, make a point about
skin color in the black community, or simply repre-
sent the shade spectrum of black folks” (Ford 2008).
11. The journalist referred to above is Britt Julious, and
the musician is Solange Knowles, whose accounts of
such microaggressions are linked to in Kambasha’s
(2016) article.
12. Hip-hop is further equated with the internet by way of
the Casey Veggies downloads referenced to emphasize
the generational difference between the protagonist
and the old school gangster Jacoby, who Malcolm
implies is outdated when he refers to the purchasing
of CDs. It is also notable that, as stated earlier, Jacoby
is played by a regular of Spike Lee’s films.
13. For artists on Spotify, “the average ‘per stream’ pay-
out to rights holders lands somewhere between
$0.006 and $0.0084” (Plaugic 2015).
14. The enormous costs of maintaining the kind of web-
based platforms described here is demonstrated by
the financial losses of the kind seen by Tidal being
shared by Spotify, the largest of the current stream-
ing services. “Spotify, while also recording a net loss
in 2015, expanded much faster than Tidal, doubling
its revenue to 1.95 billion euros ($2.19 billion)”
(Verbergt and Gauthier-Villars 2016).
15. As a small comedy, Dope could not benefit from the
kind of awards season buzz that aided the success of
Jenkin’s stunning 2016 drama Moonlight, which was
similarly led by a largely unknown African-American
cast.
16. The other films featuring a lead African-American
actor to have done as well or better than Dope for
Open Road Films are A Haunted House (2013), A
Haunted House 2 (2014), and Fifty Shades of Black
(2016)—low-budget parody comedies starring and
co-produced by Marlon Wayans. The success of
these films arguably rests upon the actor’s reputa-
tion/brand as established by the Scary Movie fran-
chise and other successful parody films that stretch
across the past two decades and a half.
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